

Bara NDiaye, Institute of History and International Relations,
University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Poland

Regionalism in West Africa.

An historical approach on the model of the Mali Empire and the AOF (French West Africa)

*Dr Bara NDiaye, Adjunct (Assistant Professor) at the Institute of History and International Relations, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn. Fields of interest: French-African relations, the problems of contemporary Africa, Russian policy towards Africa after the year 2000, Media Systems in the world. Author of three books and above 20 scientific articles: *Françafrique. History and present Day situation of French-African relations* (2010); *Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa. Selected issues* (2011); *African issues in French Media on the example of the daily "Le Monde" (1990-2010)* (2012). Co-initiator and organizer of the "African Days in Olsztyn" (since 2004). Editor-in-Chief of the scientific journal "Olsztyn Africanistic Studies", member of Polish Association of African Studies.*

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to attempt a clarification of the historical dimensions of regionalism in West Africa. The role of domestic agents such as Soundiata Keita, the emperor of Mali, who promoted the Mande Charter in 1236, known also as the Charter of Kurugan Fuga, is discussed. Another historical model of the integration process described in this paper is linked to external agents, and concerns the construction of French West Africa Federation (AOF). The colonial dimensions and its repercussions on regionalism in the postcolonial era since 1960 will be also analyzed. Theoretical aspects of regionalism and regional and sub-regional organizations in West Africa are briefly presented.

Introduction and overview

Regionalism has a long history and seems to be a part of the history of international economic relations. Economic regionalism is not a recent phenomenon; Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner described four waves of regionalism during the last two centuries: during the second half of the XIX century, between European countries and also between China, India and Great Britain; during the inter-war period, by the consolidation of colonial empires; after the Second World War in Europe, Asia, Africa, etc.; in the late eighties, with the revival of regionalism¹.

This new regionalism is the subject of various classifications. Balassa's typology of 1961 seems to be the oldest. It consist of five stages: free trade area, customs union, common or single market, and economic union which should ultimately lead to the final stage, political union. These different degrees of integration fit together and are the necessary steps to achieve political union. We think, with Yann Echinard and Laetitia Guilhot, that this classification "seems far too simplistic and deterministic to account for the present diversity of regional agreements. This taxonomy is based on the institutional development of the European Union."² However, various studies in progress do not follow the same process as the latter., Balassa's typology therefore appears outdated for capturing the diversity of experiences, despite its undeniable educational force. It is therefore appropriate to present typologies seeking to explain this diversity. These attempts at classification are varied and do not offer the same angles of entry to explain regional processes.

¹ D. Mansfield, H. V. Milner, *The new wave of regionalism*, "International Organization", vol. LIII, n° 3, 1999, pp. 589-627.

² Y. Echinard, L. Guilhot, *Le « nouveau régionalisme » de quoi parlons-nous ?*, Annuaire français de relations internationales 2007, volume VIII 2007 p. 775-792.

According to Fredrik Söderbaum, two main approaches can be used to understand the new regionalism. The first, mainstream, approach perceives this process as a means of solving problems of collective action; there are three main points of view:

1. neo-realism: The neo-realists argue that international relations are anarchic, resulting from competition between countries and, ultimately, conflict. In this context, only the presence of an hegemony can boost regional cooperation.
2. liberal institutionalism: For liberal institutionalism, states are grouped regionally to produce public goods and manage negative externalities caused by their economic interdependence.
3. liberal regional economic integration: The “Liberal Regional Economic Integration” approach is dominated by the theory of regional economic integration; that is to say, the body of theory on customs unions and optimum currency areas. This point of view focuses on creating positive effects and avoiding the misuse of welfare that can be a consequence of the introduction of a regional agreement.

The second approach, which includes all heterodox approaches, reflects a broader, more critical perception, of regionalism; regional integration goes beyond this traditional, mainstream approach, not considering the state as a unit and central actor, nor regional organizations and openness as a panacea for economic development.³

Christian Deblock, however, did not support the dual approach of regional integration proposed by Fredrik Söderbaum. In his view, regionalism cannot be dissociated from the idea of a problem to solve. He proposed another dual approach: first, the functionalists, who view regionalism as a normative framework, and on the other hand, structuralists, who consider it as a challenge for the major powers. According to Deblock, this dichotomy does not always satisfactorily report the new regionalism. He proposes another approach, based on institutionalism; this approach is meant to be explanatory in that such institutionalism had little interest towards the new regionalism. He proposes to distinguish regional agreements by the institutional form they take. There have been two types: “community” agreements and “contractual” agreements. In the latter, the changing content of the Agreement is determined by the players. Their scope is limited to commitments. In “community” agreements, since sovereignty is transferred to a supranational institution, an endogenous dynamic is created and the agreement may change without the action of state actors.⁴

Catherine Figuière and Laetitia Guilhot define regionalization - the economic reality of regional processes - as a concentration of economic flows within a given geographical region, regionalism - institutional reality - as a construction policy pursued by the states and implemented by an agreement in order to organize the relations between countries and promote cooperation between them in various fields, and regional economic integration as a combination of “regionalization” and “regionalism” – “a regional space is said to be regionally integrated, if and only if it registers a concentration of flows between nations that constitute it, and if it reveals an institutional coordination to establish lasting common rules”⁵.

Early integration experiences

As far as Africa is concerned, it seems that the process of regional integration began earlier. Even if the integration of peoples and kingdoms in the West part of Africa, known then as Western Sudan (*Bilad es Sudan* by the Arabs) was indeed created by force, very large, well organized empires did exist there in the past for a long period of time. The Empire of Ghana was the first, in the early VII century, then The Empire of Mali and the third, the largest, was The Empire of Songhaj, in the XVth Century.

The empire of Mali was one of the most prestigious and flourishing of the African empires in the 13th and 14th centuries. It succeeded to the empire of Ghana, lying between the Sahara and the

³ F. Söderbaum, *Rethinking the new regionalism*, 13th Nordic Political Science Association Meeting, 15-17 August 2002, quoted by Y. Echinard, L. Guilhot, *Le « nouveau régionalisme » de quoi parlons-nous ?* «Annuaire français de relations internationales» 2007, volume VIII 2007, p. 775-792.

⁴ C. Deblock, *Régionalisme économique et mondialisation: que nous apprennent les théories?*, in P. Berthaud/G. Kebabdjian (eds.), *La Question politique en économie internationale*, La Découverte, 2006, pp. 248-260; C. Deblock, «Régionalisme, arrangements institutionnels hybrides et gouvernance à la carte?», «Multilatéralisme régional», n° 4, 2006.

⁵ C. Figuière, L. Guilhot, *Caractériser les processus régionaux: les apports d'une approche en termes de coordination*, «Mondes en développement», n° 135, 2006, p. 85.

tropics, the Atlantic and the Niger Bend, the area now occupied by Mali, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea and Mauritania. According to Malian historian Boubacar Segha Diallo, the origin and meaning of the name Mali is difficult to establish. For some, Mali is the name of the hippopotamus totem of Sundiata Keita, founder of the empire. For others, it is the name of a city (Mallal), known to Arab authors as Albakri. In fact, Mali, or Melli, is simply the land of Mandeka (man of the Mande). Mande is the cradle of the empire of Mali, the mother province.⁶ Sundiata Keita promoted the Mande Charter in 1236, known also as the Charter of Kurukan Fuga⁷, which, despite its oral character, may be considered as the first ever declaration of Human Rights. Some elements of this Charter are even now respected by most people in the Western part of Sub-Saharan Africa. Some African researchers consider that the Mande Charter lies behind ECOWAS becoming one of the first regional organizations to adopt the free circulation of peoples within its area. Mangone Niang, former director of The Center for Linguistic & Historical Study of Oral Tradition, noted that “the Kurukan Fuga Charter was created after a bloody war between populations, who finally became very close. It is also the result of a process, begun with “Mandé Kalikan” (The Mande Oath) that governed the hunters’ way of life at that time.”⁸ For Niang, the Kurukan Fuga Act was the celebration of a legal code, broadened and more detailed, which from that moment had the force of law for all the community groups of Mandé.⁹ “The most celebrated king of Mali was Mansa Musa. He greatly extended Mali's territory and power during his reign. He made a name for himself in distant regions throughout the Muslim world through his pilgrimage to Mecca (...). Sixty thousand people and eighty camels carrying 300 lbs. of gold each accompanied him to Mecca.”¹⁰

We can consider that this was the beginning of a living together under the rule of a strong centralized power directed by an Emperor. But the coming of Europeans in the XV century radically changed the situation. Many negative events then happened until colonization. France, after achieving colonial conquest, tried to organize its possessions into two big Federations. The first of them was AOF (French West Africa), another historical model of an integration process imposed by a colonial power.

French West Africa (AOF) – a federation imposed by colonial power

The decree of June 16, 1895 is the birth of the General Government of French West Africa (AOF), which then included Senegal, French Sudan, French Guinea and Ivory Coast. Several successive decrees were promulgated from 1895 to 1904, the most important text was that of October 18, 1904 and merited the title Charter of French West Africa. This text was introduced by the father of the AOF, Ernest Roume¹¹, who gave, in essence, a physiognomy to this vast body of territories which remained until the end of World War II¹².

After 1904, the Governor General represented the French Republic throughout AOF. This was a territory covering an area of 4.5 million km², gathered in a massive block of 3600 km from west to

⁶ B. S. Diallo, *L'empire du Mali*, <http://www.histoire-afrique.org/article163.html> [accessed April 17, 2011].

⁷ The “Charte de Kurukan Fuga”; was reconstructed by Mandinka «traditionnistes» from Senegal, Mali and Guinea at a workshop on community radio in the Guinean town of Kankan in march 1998. This workshop was financed by The International Organization of Francophony and Swiss Cooperation. The traditionnistes first discussed their version in a closed hearing. The Guinean judge, Siriman Kouyaté, then translated the proceedings into French and organised it in 44 articles and a Preamble to turn it into the equivalent of a modern constitution. *Africa History Mali. The Mande Charter Controversy*, <http://www.sociolingo.com/2009/07/the-mande-charter-controversy-a-magna-carta-for-africa/> [accessed March 12, 2011].

⁸ M. Niang, *The Kurukan Fuga Charter: An example of a Endogenous Governance Mechanism for Conflict Prevention*, <http://www.westafricaconflictprevention.org/westafricaconflictprevention.org/PDF-anglais/en-intro-charter-of-kurukan-fuga.pdf> [accessed June 17, 2011].

⁹ The provisions of the Act concern municipal organization, as well as property management and nature. For example, provision 5: “Every person has the right to life and to preserve his physical integrity...”. The text should be understood within the context that it was conceived: wars of all types, lack of human dignity and values, slavery, etc. And, in those fragmented world, there was a strong desire for law and order, with a long and strenuous effort to create a new conciliatory and legislative spirit – the same effort then and today – that would strike a balance between differences through social negotiation. Provision 7 introduced the sanankuya (known today as “kinship of pleasantry”, “joking cousinship” or “congenial relationship”) among the members that formed the Mandé communities. Sources: M. Niang, *The Kurukan Fuga Charter: An example of an Endogenous Governance Mechanism for Conflict Prevention*, op.cit.

¹⁰ <http://www.africankingdoms.com/> [Accessed April 14, 2011].

¹¹ Ernest Roume Nestor (1858-1941) - French colonial administrator, a former governor general of AOF March 15, 1902 February 18, 1908. Sources: J.-R. de Benoist, *La Balkanisation de l'Afrique Occidentale Française* (The Balkanization of French West Africa), Dakar-Abidjan-Lome 1979, p. 27.

¹² J.-R. de Benoist, *La Balkanisation de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, (The Balkanization of French West Africa)*, Dakar-Abidjan-Lome 1979, p. 27.

east (from Dakar to Lake Chad) and 2500 km from south to north (from Tabou to the northern border of Mauritania). He was assisted by a Secretary General who had authority over a number of general directors: Finance, Public Works, Political, Administrative and Social, Economic Affairs, Health etc, and also the French Institute of Black Africa.¹³ Initially charged with simple coordination, these branches gradually increased their authority over local governments and became real organs of command.

A Governing Council and a Council of Administrative Disputes were common to all territories. There were eight territories in 1944:

1 The district of Dakar and Dependencies - 530 km², 180,000 inhabitants (including 23,000 Europeans, including the military): was detached from the colony of Senegal by a decree of November 27, 1924, this district included Dakar and its suburbs, the island of Goree and, after 1937, the town of Rufisque and its suburbs; it was a form of Federal Territory, administered directly by the Governor General;

2. The colony of Senegal¹⁴, 190, 000 km², 1.7 million inhabitants (including 11, 000 Europeans), capital St. Louis, under the authority of a governor from 1763, it was provided, in 1879, with a General Council, which in 1920 became a Colonial Council; the status of the inhabitants of the "Four Communes" (Dakar, Goree, Rufisque, St. Louis) was that of French citizens, as confirmed by law (29 September 1916). From 1871, Senegal sent a representative to the French National Assembly;

3. The colony of Sudan (known as French Sudan, to distinguish it from Anglo-Egyptian Sudan), 1.5 million km², 3,800,000 inhabitants (3000 Europeans), capital Bamako, instituted in 1891 as the Sudan, dislocated in October 1899, recreated in October 1904 with the name Upper Senegal-Niger, and re-named French Sudan in December, 1920;

4. The colony of Mauritania - 850 000 km², 370,000 inhabitants (including 700 Europeans); initially a military territory, became civil territory in October, 1904, with a capital at Saint-Louis; was Senegalese territory in 1919, before becoming a colony on 1 January 1921 (decree of December 4, 1920);

5. The colony of Guinea, 245 000 km², 2 million inhabitants (4000 Europeans), capital Conakry, with facilities in the Gold Coast and the Gulf of Benin, it was detached from Senegal in January 1890 (Decree of 1 August 1889) known as the Southern Rivers, became an autonomous territory in December, 1891 known as French Guinea and dependencies.

6. The colony of Ivory Coast, 475 000 km², 4 million inhabitants (4000 Europeans), became a self-governing colony under the name of Côte d'Ivoire, in March 1893, with a capital city first in Grand-Bassam, then Bingerville (1900) before transferring in 1931 to Abidjan.

7. The colony of Dahomey, 115,000 km², 1.4 million inhabitants (1300 Europeans), the capital Porto-Novo: became a separate colony March 10, 1893, known as Benin, then on June 22 1894, Dahomey and dependencies;

8. The colony of Niger, 1.3 million km², 2 million inhabitants (including 700 Europeans); initially a military territory, became a civil territory in December, 1920, and then a colony in December, 1921; its capital was moved from Zinder to Niamey on December 28, 1926.

The colony of Upper Volta, incorporated in March, 1919 with the eastern regions of the French Sudan, was dissolved in September, 1932, and its territory divided between Ivory Coast, French Sudan and Niger.

The population of Upper Volta and its traditional chiefs did not come to terms with this fact. They directed a letter to the various French institutions, asking for restoration of the borders of 1932. It should be noted that while the colonial regime lasted, the residents had no right to organize themselves into unions, political parties or associations. This situation lasted until 1946, when the new constitution granted the French colonized communities the right to form trade unions, political parties

¹³ Now the University of Dakar

¹⁴ In the opinion of former French journalist Philippe Decraene "The Senegalese, unlike the Ghanaians or the Nigerians, for example, do not suffer from any complexes that have plagued some former colonies. Senegal had its first General Council in 1840, sent representatives in 1848 to the French Parliament, was endowed with municipal councils in 1872. The "Senegalese sharpshooters" (*Tirailleurs Senegalais*) won for France a colonial empire in West Africa. Senegalese elites like to recall that the city of St. Louis was founded in the same year that "Le Cid" was shown at the French Comedy for the first time, and that in 1789 the inhabitants of that city sent to the States General at Versailles a voluminous list of grievances." P. Decraene, *The journey of Mr. Pompidou to Black Africa: the opening should take precedence over continuity*, "French Review of Political African Studies" nr 63 III 1971, p. 84-99.

and associations. The first political party of Upper Volta, UDIHV (Union for Defending the Interests of Upper Volta), put forward a request for the restitution of the territory of Upper Volta. On September 4, 1947, the French National Assembly voted to restore the colony of Upper Volta with borders as in 1932.

Separation of the two colonies could not be carried out without political consequences.

In relation to Upper Volta and Ivory Coast Felix Houphouët Boigny is a key figure in the overall internal and external events over a very long time. Felix Houphouët Boigny won the only place as a representative of Ivory Coast in the French National Assembly elections of 1945, when the colony was still connected to Upper Volta.

Each colony was administered by a Governor, assisted by a Secretary General (except in Mauritania).

We may focus on the fact that this kind of integration was imposed by France, being interested in her lasting control and domination over the region. This system has precisely shaped a universe of subjects under special regulations such as the famous “forced labor” which made local societies provide a regular and free workforce for public facilities (roads, railways, etc.) and for some private interests. In fact, the introduction of the Indigenous Peoples’ Code¹⁵ to a large extent resulted from the calculation that the vast African empire had to cost the metropolis as little as possible. For this reason, each colony, each federation should itself find the resources for its development, including the mobilization of the local workforce.

However, Charles de Gaulle and Jacques Foccart arbitrarily removed the two federations, whose respective headquarters were Dakar and Brazzaville, during the constitutional review process, which instituted the French-African Community. Among the African elite opinion was divided; Houphouët-Boigny was an uncompromising opponent of the maintenance of AOF¹⁶. The majority of African leaders, like Senegal's father of independence, Leopold Sedar Senghor estimated that the dismantling of existing federations would lead to independent countries that were not economically viable. Senghor said that “Balkanization means artificially dividing these eight territories into political, economic and cultural entities, that do not ignore the metropolis, but ignore each other. Entities without reality, because it is clear that the current borders of the territories are only the fruit of chance and military intrigues. They do not correspond to reality: neither geographic nor economic nor ethnic nor linguistic ... Even if we retain only the economic and cultural arguments, what would represent, in the Republic, the weight of little Senegal, tiny Ivory Coast with two million people, - taking into consideration only the so called “rich” territories - towards a metropolitan population of 40 million, the richest in resources and intelligence among the nations of Western Europe? ... Accepting the balkanization of Africa is accepting misery, alienation, the loss of our reason for living.”¹⁷ It seems that, at the end of years 50, French colonial power adopted another strategy consisting of doing everything to avoid close political ties with African colonies. This, anyway, is the point of view developed by Alexandre Gerbi, a French historian¹⁸. Later, Jacques Foccart, General de Gaulle’s grey eminence recognizes that the breakup of the Federations was intentional: “De Gaulle recognized that the federations were too diverse to survive once the colonial takeover had been rejected. They would inevitably become unstable and would probably burst into bitterness and conflict. The disappearance of the federations before independence avoided this potentially dangerous problem and left the African

¹⁵ The Indigenous People’s Code was adopted on June 28, 1881. Then, in 1887, the French government imposed the Code on all its colonies. In general, this code concerned immigrant workers, forced labor, a prohibition on night driving, requisitions, taxes and a host of other equally degrading measures. It was a collection of discretionary measures intended to impose “good colonial order”, that is, the institutionalization of inequality and injustice. This code was constantly “improved” in order to adapt to the interests of the settlers “realities of the country”. The Indigenous People’s Code distinguished two categories of citizens: French citizens (ethnic metropolitan) and French subjects, that is to say, the black Africans, Malagasy, immigrant workers and so on. French subjects submitted to the Indigenous People’s Code were deprived of most of their freedom and their political rights; civilly, they retained only their personal status, religious origin or customs. Sources : http://www.tlfg.ulaval.ca/Axl/afrique/indigenat_code.htm [accessed June 08,2011].

¹⁶ B. NDiaye, *Françafrique. Stosunki francusko-afrykańskie – wczoraj i dziś, (History and present Day situation of French-African relations)*, IHSM, UWM w Olsztynie, Olsztyn 2010, p. 77.

¹⁷ Sources : J.-R de Benoist, *La balkanisation de l’Afrique Occidentale Française*, Dakar-Abidjan-Lomé 1979, p. 148.

¹⁸ See more on this topic: A. Gerbi (red.), *Décolonisation de l’Afrique ex-Française. Enjeux pour l’Afrique et la France d’aujourd’hui*, Paris 2010 ; A. Gerbi, *Histoire occultée de la décolonisation franco-africaine*, Paris 2006.

States more manageable.”¹⁹ However, Francis Terry McNamara, the former American ambassador, concluded, “in fact, separated States should be much easier to manipulate than two big Federations!”²⁰ In any case, this issue was decided without debate or appeal, even though the definition of the Community was the key issue of antagonism. The French African Community was the last entity before access to independence by former French colonies. Only Guinea voted no to the referendum that gave birth to the Community and automatically obtained its freedom in 1958. The other colonies acceded to independence two years later, in 1960.

The colonial legacy

Since 1960, Africa has been a very active participant in the regionalist trend. The global environment and external factors have had a strong influence on African regionalism. The importance of history must be borne in mind when assessing the possible causes of African regionalism²¹. The process of decolonization causes an important and deep regional disintegration resulting from the political division. “Artificial” boundaries are a frequent cause of ethnic conflict, born as a result of the separatist aspirations of the individual tribes. The present state of African post-colonial countries is largely determined by the history of colonization. In the case of West Africa, colonization processes divided the region into spheres of influence of various colonial powers such as England, France and Portugal. Consequently, this part of the continent has become multilingual, complicating the integration of countries in the region. Scholars such as H el ene Gandois, from the University of Oxford focus on the striking differences between regionalism in Francophone and Anglophone Africa. “Schematically, francophone African states seem to have been consistently striving towards some form of union at the sub-regional level, while Anglophone states seem to have shied away from such a solution.”²² It seems to us that an explanation for this situation is linked with the impact level of colonization in Francophone and Anglophone Africa. British indirect rule was at first interested in economic exploitation; French direct rule controlled everything from administration, to the economy, to culture and so on. French colonization aimed, furthermore, at economic exploitation, to make the African a Black French by the politics of cultural domination and assimilation. These politics left a permanent mark on the minds of the first leaders of post-colonial French Africa. For example, Leopold Sedar Senghor, the first president of Senegal remembers: “The AOF was a living reality in the minds and hearts of many of its inhabitants, officials were employed interchangeably in the eight territories, students who found themselves first at the Ecole Normale William-Ponty²³, then went to the University of Dakar; traders could ignore borders and work easily in neighboring countries; politicians and unionists were frequently together at meetings of federal organizations”.²⁴

At the end of the 50th year a lot of organization has been created in this area. Some exist until today, others have changed names and others were at the beginning deprived of their contents. We mean in this last case the Federation of Mali, a concept which was to gather many more West African countries (the Federation of West Africa). The creation of the Federation of West Africa began in October 1958, but faced many obstacles. Under pressure from the Ivory Coast, discreetly supported by France, Dahomey and Upper Volta withdrew. The Federation of Mali, created in April 1959, finally united only Senegal and Sudan. The union between these two countries, opposed ideologically and

¹⁹ Testimony of J. Foccart collected by U.S. Ambassador Francis Terry McNamara, author of *France in Black Africa*, Washington DC 1989, quoted by P. P ean, *Man of the shadows. Survey items around Jacques Foccart, the most mysterious and most powerful man of the Fifth Republic*, Paris 1990.

²⁰ Ibidem.

²¹ H. Gandois, *Regionalism, a solution for the weak? A case study on Africa*, op. cit.

²² Ibidem.

²³ The Ecole Normale William Ponty is the Pedagogical Federal French School in West Africa (AOF) which educated - before the era of independence - most of the teachers, doctors and executives of West Africa, including many Ministers and Heads of State or Government, such as Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Modibo Keita, Hamani Diori, Sylvanus Olympio, Mamadou Dia ... The school changed its name, status and location several times: created in St. Louis in 1903, transferred to Gor e Island in 1913, then S ebikhotane near Rufisque in 1937. The school remained after independence, but lost its specificity following educational reforms and an increase in teacher training schools. Seen as a “prestigious” institution, a “pool” or “nursery” for future leaders by some, it is decried by others as an ideological instrument, “playing the same role as the colonial army with infantry” “a school of submission, compromise, balance at all costs” (Guy Ossito Midiohouan, « Litt erature africaine : Une critique de la critique » (  propos d'Ousmane Soc  Diop) in *Peuples noirs, peuples africains*, n  18, 1980, p. 75-88), or “the graveyard of African intelligence” (Mohamadou Kane, *Birago Diop*, Pr sence Africaine, Paris, 1971, p. 15). Beyond the different approaches, the Ecole Normale William Ponty has certainly played a significant role in the social, cultural and political life of twentieth century West Africa.

²⁴ J.-R. de Benoist, op. cit., p. 7.

politically, created only internal conflict. The Federation broke up on August 20, 1960. General de Gaulle was against a Federation between Senegal and Mali. During the official talks, he rather spoke about “Senegal and Sudan groups in the Federation of Mali.”²⁵ He explained this attitude by the fact that the Federation was not a unitary state, not a member of the Community. In reality, he saw in the consolidation of the union of Guinea with Ghana a danger to French-African relations. Therefore he feared that the affinities of Modibo Keita, the Sudanese (Mali) leader with these countries could one day lead him to come closer to this Union.

Entente Council

Entente Council (*Le Conseil de l'Entente*) now links five members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger and Togo. First contacts between Ivory Coast, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso now) and Niger took place at the beginning of May 1959. Dahomey (now Benin) had just sent observers to Abidjan, since earlier there had been anti Dahomey demonstrations in Ivory Coast. The first official meeting of the Entente Council took place at the end of May 1959, its main outcome was the creation of a solidarity Fund funded by 10% income transfer from each member country. Other agreements were signed such as full Customs Union, harmonization of the statutes of the civil service and labor code, a common struggle against major endemic diseases and agricultural pests. At the beginning of 1960 a conflict arose between Upper Volta and Ivory Coast. The Ivorian government took unilateral action in abolishing the poll taxes. This decision caused unrest in Haute-Volta, where the tax was still imposed. The Upper Volta president, Maurice Yameogo, made a rapprochement with Ghana. The next meeting of the Entente Council's leaders, held in Bobo-Dioulasso (Upper Volta) on March the 8 – 9, 1960 put an end to the controversy. Nevertheless, in Abidjan Ivorian leaders remained hostile to any supranational organization with an authoritarian character.²⁶

The Entente Council got a new start in 2009. The Heads of State and Government of the five member countries of the Entente Council came together, on July 11, 2009 in the Ivorian political capital Yamoussoukro, for the institution's summit. The meeting enabled a renaissance of the Council after more than ten years without activity. For Yayi Boni the Beninese Head of State, the inactivity of the EC for more than a decade can be explained by various crises that arose in the member countries.²⁷ It goes without saying that the biggest of them, of course, remains the crisis in Ivory Coast. The Ivorian crisis of the late twentieth century seems to be linked to the political and economic regime established by Houphouët-Boigny and which, in many respects, was forged as a direct continuity of colonial development. Considered for a long time as a haven of peace and stability in West Africa, Ivory Coast entered, in the late 1990s, a cycle of violence marked by multiple coups, rebellions and the radicalization of political debates around issues of Ivorian citizenship (*l'ivoirité*). This former French colony was the “economic powerhouse” of the sub-region and the model for French-African relations that had been forged from before independence was proclaimed on August 7, 1960, through close collaboration between French elites and Felix Houphouët-Boigny, then minister of the French Fourth Republic. Having made the choice to remain under French control, against the anti-colonial and Pan-Africanist option promoted by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea, President Houphouët-Boigny built the prosperity and stability of the Ivory Coast by relying in particular on the economy of plantation. “In Ivory Coast, as in other African countries, the colonial state played a crucial role in the formation of ethnic identities and translating it into - spatial and mental - space of power. Colonial anthropologists, including Maurice Delafosse who was the first to distinguish in that territory large language families such as Agni, Jula, Senufo, etc., began a process of classification of groups embodying cultural stereotypes whose traces are still found today”.²⁸ From that time on, almost every African conflict is analyzed through the ethnic approach by western experts.

The conflict seemed to be resolved with the intervention of ONUCI and the French under a UN mandate. Former President Laurent Gbagbo was arrested, and the elected president in the runoff

²⁵ See : AN, FPR 107, FPR 121, Procès verbal du Conseil exécutif de la Communauté, du 4 au 6 mai 1959 ; AN, FPR 121, Réunion des ministres conseillers, le 17 septembre 1959.

²⁶ J. R. de Benoist, *La balkanisation de l'Afrique Occidentale Française*, NEA Dakar-Abidjan-Lomé 1979, p. 254.

²⁷ Alban Kini, *Organisation sous-régionale : Une seconde vie pour le Conseil de l'entente*, «Sidwaya», <http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article32370> [accessed June 11, 2011].

²⁸ Banégas R., Steck J-F, *Côte d'Ivoire*, http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/cote-d-ivoire/#i_20043 [accessed June 12, 2011].

election of 28 November 2010, Alassane Ouattara, is trying to rebuild the devastated country. It seems, however, that this will be not easy since the guerillas supporting him massacred many civilians²⁹.

Among other sub-regional and regional organizations that arose in West Africa we can briefly describe, chronologically:

ALG - Integrated Development Authority of Liptako-Gourma (*Autorité de Développement Intégré de la Région du Liptako-Gourma -ALG*)

From the earliest years of independence, Burkina Faso, the Republic of Mali and Niger Republic began to develop solidarity and cooperation among states in a regional framework and this, in view of integrated and harmonious development of the Liptako-Gourma region, straddles their common border. This resulted in the signature on 3 December 1970 in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) by the Heads of State of Burkina Faso, the Republic of Mali and the Republic of Niger, of a Memorandum of Agreement, establishing the Authority for Integrated Development of Liptako-Gourma (ALG). Through this agreement, the Heads of State intended to focus particularly on the optimal development of mineral resources, energy, water, agriculture and fisheries of Liptako-Gourma. The decision of the three states to create an institution whose purpose is to promote the socio-economic development of a common region was innovative at that time. In fact, the ALG is one of the first sub-regional organization in West Africa. The mission assigned to the ALG is to promote the harmonious and integrated development of Liptako-Gourma by the development and exchange, within a regional framework, of mineral resources, energy, water, agro-pastoral products and fishing in its intervention area.³⁰

OMVS (*Organistaion pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal*) - Organization for the Development of the Senegal River

The Agreement signed on 11 March 1972 in Nouakchott by the Heads of State of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal determines the tasks and powers of the organization. The Convention on the legal status of the river Senegal was signed on 11 March 1972. Through this agreement, the river Senegal and its tributaries are considered “an international watercourse” in the territory of the Republic of Mali, Republic of Mauritania and the Republic of Senegal. It guarantees freedom of navigation and equal rights in all forms of use of water from the river.³¹

²⁹ For four months of negotiations, President Ouattara, recognized as the legitimate ruler of the international community, helplessly demanded that Gbagbo step down as president. In March 2011, encouraged by the West and the United Nations, Ouattara gave to his partisans in the north, renamed the Republican Forces of Ivory Coast (Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire - FRCI), an order to set off south for Abidjan. A victorious march was made possible thanks to the support, given by soldiers of the UN peacekeeping troops (12 thousand) and France (about 2 thousand). On 11 April 2011, Laurent Gbagbo was arrested in Abidjan. Ouattara's soldiers took Gbagbo to the Golf Hotel, which was the government seat. Ouattara declared that Gbagbo would face justice, and every precaution was taken to ensure his safety; nonetheless, the guerrillas fighting on Ouattara's side committed mass murder. See: Jagielski, War of the Coast, "Gazeta Wyborcza", electronic version, http://wyborcza.pl/dziennikarze/1,84009.9416518,Wojna_o_Wybrzeze.html [accessed May 5, 2011]. On April 27 the army of President Alassane Ouattara eliminated Ibrahim Coulibaly known as “IB”, the head of “an invisible commando, who participated in the arrest of former President Laurent Gbagbo. Guillaume Soro, the current Prime Minister, was an historic opponent of the rebellion of Ibrahim Coulibaly responsible for the failed coup in 2002, directed against the person of Laurent Gbagbo. President Alassane Ouattara, in an interview with the French daily “La Croix” on April 28, 2011, estimated that the violence after the elections in Ivory Coast had caused 3,000 deaths. The United Nations gave the number as about 1,000 fatalities. President Ouattara also announced the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and a national unity government. See: Côte d'Ivoire: le chef du «commando invisible” a été tué, Le Monde, electronic version, www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/04/28/cote-d-ivoire-le-chef-du-commando-invisible-a-ete-tue [accessed April 28, 2011]. The investiture ceremony was held in Jamusokro on May 21, 2011 in the presence of about 20 African presidents and French President Nicolas Sarkozy. French diplomats stressed that the presence of Nicolas Sarkozy in Côte d'Ivoire “will open a new chapter in relations between France and Côte d'Ivoire after a decade of crisis” – see: Côte d'Ivoire: Yamoussoukro prêt pour l'investiture d'Alassane Ouattara, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20110520-yamoussoukro-prete-investiture-ouattara> [accessed May 21, 2011]. During his first visit, Sarkozy announced at a meeting at the French military base in Port-Bouet in the suburbs of Abidjan that, with French citizens living in Ivory Coast, French troops will remain stationed in Ivory Coast to protect these citizens. Their aim will be to protect the thousand French who live there and to assure their security. President Sarkozy also stressed that the local authorities agree to the military presence. At the same time he renounced attempts to link the presence of French troops in an attempt to interfere in the governmental policy of Ivory Coast. “We're not here in order to guarantee stability”- said Sarkozy. Source: Sarkozy leaves soldiers <http://afryka.org/?showNewsPlus=5917> [accessed May 05, 2011].

³⁰ http://www.liptakogourma.org/spip.php?page=article&id_article=1 [accessed June 05, 2011].

³¹ <http://www.omvs-soe.org/presentationomvs.htm> [accessed October 31, 2010].

CEAO (*Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest*) - Economic Community of West Africa

Six West African countries signed the CEAO treaty in Bamako in 1972 and ratified it in 1973 in Abidjan. Treaty establishes a harmonized area of trade and economic integration. The members are Ivory Coast, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and are linked historically, geographically, linguistically, and by currency (with the exception of Mauritania). The Treaty came into force on 1 January 1974. According to the Senegalese economist Makhtar Diouf, the Treaty instituting the Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO) in 1973 was written by Jacques David, a French former Customs inspector in Central Africa, where he was also very active in the Customs Union of Central African States (UDEAC), the ancestor of the present CEMAC (*Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale* - Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa). Diouf therefore considers that the strategy of economic integration in Africa has never been thought through from the Interior, by Africans. It was first imposed by the colonial authorities and then left to expert former colonial citizens.³² Another example strengthening Makhtar Diouf's thesis was the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA) in 1994, encouraged by the EU, probably under French pressure, to replace the CEAO which was no longer effective (UEMOA is discussed further later)

CILSS (*Comité permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel*) - Permanent Inter-State Committee for Combating Drought in the Sahel

This committee was founded on September 12, 1973, after severe drought hit the Sahel in the 70s. It brings together nine CILSS countries, including four coastal states (Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania and Senegal), and four other that do not have access to the coast (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad), and one island chain (Cabo Verde)³³.

ECOWAS (*Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest*) - Economic Community of West African States

Established by the Treaty of Lagos on May 28, 1975. It includes fifteen West African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. Initially there were sixteen, but Mauritania withdrew in 2001. Its main aim is to promote economic integration through the creation of a market within the region. In the face of the regional conflicts which arose in April 1990 a peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, intervened in Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast. "The mission of ECOWAS is to promote co-operation and development in all spheres of economic activity through the removal of all forms of trade barriers and obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods and services, as well as the harmonizing of regional sector policies. The main objective is to establish a large West African common market and create a monetary union."³⁴ The Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), revised in 1992, stipulates that "ECOWAS will be the sole economic community in the sub-region." Jean de Dieu Somda, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has compared ECOWAS to "a beautiful animal that sleeps; do not wake it up suddenly, or it may break the porcelain. But, we must resolutely wake it up! And if we manage to wake it, we get extraordinary things. But now it is a beautiful animal that sleeps. Currently, it is beginning to emerge from its torpor. We must allow some time to permit it to wake up fully."³⁵

However, two years later, in 1994, the EU encouraged the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA) to replace the Economic Community of West Africa

³² M. Diouf *Mondialisme et Régionalisme. Le "nouveau régionalisme" en Afrique*, IFAN, Cheikh Anta Diop University, Dakar 2002.

³³ <http://www.cilss.bf/spip.php?rubrique1> [accessed October 31, 2010].

³⁴ <http://www.bidc-ebid.org/en/cedeao.php> [accessed June 12, 2011].

³⁵ J. D. Somda : *La CEDEAO est une belle bête qui dort ...*, <http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article28616&rubrique62> [accessed June 15, 2011].

(CEAO) which was no longer effective. It seems this was evidence of a change of perspective since, during the 1980s, much effort was made by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to streamline the integration of Africa, ending the proliferation of communities by reducing their number to have only a single sub-regional economic community. The result of this change is that Africa has many more economic communities. This is a unique situation in the world and constitutes a serious handicap for successful economic integration. Makhtar Diouf has called this phenomenon “balkanization-integration” - the current trend to undertake regional integration among smaller and smaller groups of countries, even if it means breaking large communities previously formed.³⁶

OMVG (Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Gambia) - Organization for the Development of the River Gambia

Founded in 1978 by Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Senegal. OMVG aims to coordinate management of water resources in the three basins, with a total area of 118,000 km². To fulfill this mission, OMVG coordinates various projects covering a wide range of aspects, ranging from water resource management in the context of land management to the construction of a large regional hydroelectric dam.³⁷

UEMOA (WAEMU) – a continuation of the AOF or an economic integration shaped by structural adjustment?

In the aftermath of independence, six West African countries, members of the Franc Zone (CFA), Benin (then Dahomey), Burkina Faso (then Upper-Volta), Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Senegal and Togo (in 1963) created, on 12 May 1962, the West African Monetary Union (WAMU), demonstrating their commitment to monetary cooperation both among themselves, within a union, and with France in the Franc Zone (CFA). Mali joined the WAMU in June 1984, after requesting reintegration in the Franc Zone, which it had left in 1962. In 1973 the WAMU treaty was revised, the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO)³⁸ was given new statutes, the Bank of West African Development (BOAD) was created and new cooperation agreements with France were signed. Regulatory mechanisms, which ensure the cohesion and monetary stability of the Union, were introduced in the new texts. With a more stable monetary environment - a common currency, anchoring of the French franc and money management rules - member countries of the WAMU, as with other countries of the Franc Zone, experienced, on average, better economic performance than other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Economic growth was generally higher than population growth, which improved the living conditions. In the 80's, two major external shocks contributed to destabilizing the economies of the WAMU and to reversing economic growth: the collapse of commodity prices, an important source of export earnings, the real appreciation of the CFA franc, and the combined effect of a rising French franc and the downward adjustment of exchange rates in neighboring countries outside the franc zone. The main macroeconomic and financial indicators deteriorated rapidly, plunging the countries of the WAMU into a deep economic crisis. Faced with the economic crisis the countries of the WAMU, from 1990, expressed their desire to deepen their economic integration in addition to monetary union. It became

³⁶ M. Diouf *Mondialisme et Régionalisme...*, op. cit.

³⁷ http://polyrama.epfl.ch/art_P114_Quatre_etats.html [accessed October 31, 2010].

³⁸ The Central Bank of West African States was founded on April 4, 1959, replacing the Issuing Institute of French West Africa and Togo. Since then, the BCEAO has always been headed by the a French man. Its current layout was created at the time of signing of the Treaty of West African Monetary Union, 12 May 1962 (which came into force on 2 November 1962 and was revised on 14 November 1973). The last French director was Robert Julienne, who served as governor from 28 September 1962 until 1973, the bank's headquarters were then in Paris. Before transferring management of the bank and the bank's headquarters to Africans, France requested the signing, on 4 December 1973, of a new Cooperation Agreement and a New Convention on operating accounts between the French Republic and the WAMU. Source: B. NDiaye, *Françafrique. Stosunki francusko-afrykańskie*, op. cit. p. 172-173. The principle of operating accounts is based on the fact that France is obliged to guarantee the convertibility of the CFA franc. In exchange for this guarantee, the central banks of Africa (BCEAO, BEAC, and BCC) must provide 65% of their exchange reserves to the account of the French Treasury called the operational accounts. Each of the three central banks of the CFA zone has thus an operating account opened by the French Treasury. Initially, central banks had to give 100% of their exchange reserves to this account, but since the reform in 1973, this sum was reduced to 65%, then to 50% from September 2005; the remaining sum is to be used to pay the foreign debt of member countries. Source: *ibidem*. p. 175.

obvious that the mechanisms of monetary control should be complemented by economic reforms to ensure the cohesion of the Union and the laying of groundwork for sustainable growth. Thus, the Governor of the BCEAO has a mandate from the Heads of State of the WAMU to conduct discussions on economic integration and to prepare a treaty to that effect. The Treaty Establishing the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA - WAEMU) was signed January 10, 1994 in Dakar, two days before the devaluation of the CFA franc forced by France. Then, in 1998, the IMF introduced into the WAEMU (UEMOA) harmonization of tax rates for value added tax (VAT) to 18% for all products and all countries. This means that WAEMU (UEMOA) is a unique union in the world. In the EU, there are different VAT rates across products and countries. The extent of VAT harmonization was to come into force no later than 2002. Senegal was the first to apply conditions imposed by the IMF in order to obtain financing under "Growth facilities and Poverty Reduction". These arrangements (multilateral surveillance, common external tariff, harmonization of VAT...) with a high media coverage, were officially presented as advances in the economic integration process. In reality they were structural adjustment measures. The structural adjustment programs, poverty vehicles were applied in individual African countries over three decades. The disapproval which these programs faced in Africa and elsewhere led the Bretton-Woods institutions, supported by the European Union, to change tactics: the structural adjustment measures are presented as measures of economic integration.

External actors engaged in regionalism in West Africa

The so-called international community is engaged with different members and organizations in regional processes in Africa. The best known are:

- Former colonial powers;
- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)
- The Global Coalition for Africa (GCA); this is an innovative intergovernmental forum that brings together top African policymakers and their partners in the international community to build consensus on Africa's priority development issues. It is based on the premise that Africa can grow only from within, but to do so it needs outside support.
- The World Bank
- The IMF
- The EU

Among internal factors that hamper the integration processes in West Africa are:

- the slow but inexorable withering of economic, social and political development of West Africa: growing insecurity, progressive trade marginalization, mass poverty, corruption, bad governance;
- lack of a common policy for internal and external security, despite threats “from the North” against Niger and Mali (AQMI);
- problems of border control; nevertheless there is freedom of travel without visas in the ECOWAS area;
- distortion between UEMOA and ECOWAS;
- lack of regional market competitiveness.
- Declaration of “the independence of Azawad”, a region in the north of Mali by Tuareg rebels of Mali’s National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) on April 2012...

Perspectives of West African integration

El-Hadji Abdou Sakho, WAEMU’s Commissioner for economic policies and domestic taxes, urges political leaders to “build a dynamic sub-regional system of self-maintained production and exchange, and to focus on this goal over the logic of integration into the multilateral trading system”³⁹. This apparently confirms that UEMOA is not yet ready to play a role in the globalized world, but we must note that this Union was established with the “help” of external factors in order to have a harmonized regional market for international trade.

The African Union is leading a policy of reduction in the number of regional organizations in Africa and will recognize only 8 of them. In the West part of Africa ECOWAS is recognized as the regional organization.

- The Agricultural Policy of ECOWAS: ECOWAP, a process launched in 2010 that seeks to help each of the countries of ECOWAS to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. To ensure this funding effort, the African heads of state committed themselves, under the CAADP (Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program), to devote 10% of their budgets to agriculture, with the ambition to achieve, by 2015, an industry growth rate of 10%.
- Regional offensive for food production and against hunger
- Regional strategy for poverty reduction document (DSTRRP), aiming at a more structured and improved combination of regional programs for poverty reduction.
- Co-operation between ECOWAS / UEMOA, synergy of the two institutions, with a shared commitment to eradicate poverty in West Africa
- ECOWAS plans to launch the Eco, the currency of the second monetary zone which consists mostly of English-speaking countries, in order to adopt a single currency, replacing the eight currencies which now exist in the Community. Five years later, the Eco currency will be merged with the CFA to create a single ECOWAS currency in 2020 with the creation of the Central ECOWAS Bank also in 2020.

Conclusion

Africa’s imperative for economic integration, in the globalization context, is often presented as a newly discovered development route. This does not correspond to the historical truth, since Africa is a continent where the very first experiments in regional integration initiatives took place. We may not remember the integration processes of the Middle Ages in West Africa, but the colonial authorities established in 1895 and 1906 respectively the federations of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. There is no doubt that economic integration can be an effective factor in development, but only if it is provided and conducted appropriately. It appears that this has never been the case in Africa - hence the paradox of Africa is that the continent is mired in underdevelopment

³⁹ See E. H. A. Sakho, *L’intégration économique en Afrique de l’Ouest: analyses et perspectives*, Paris 2011.

while holding the world record for the number of sub-regional and regional organizations promoting economic integration. This is why we believe that it would be better to first consider physical integration of African countries before talking about market integration. The current proliferation of economic communities and strengthening of regional market integration is being used to keep Africa as a provider of raw materials and a consumer of imported manufactured products, forever. Africa is the lap-dog of globalization, the economic integration of national economies worldwide. Globalization, far from being a natural and inevitable historical process, is planned, prepared and processed in places where no African is invited. Globalization promotes interests that are not always those of Africa.

Bibliography

- Banégas R., Steck J-F, *Côte d'Ivoire*, http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/cote-d-ivoire/#i_20043 [accessed June 12, 2011].
- Benoist J.-R. de, (1979) *La Balkanisation de l'Afrique Occidentale Française*, , Dakar-Abidjan-Lomé.
- Deblock C., (2006) *Régionalisme économique et mondialisation: que nous apprennent les théories?*, in Pierre Berthaud / Gérard Kebadjian, *La Question politique en économie internationale*, La Découverte, Paris.
- Delafosse M., (1912) *Haut Sénégal - Niger*, Paris.
- Diallo B. S., *L'empire du Mali*, <http://www.histoire-afrique.org/article163.html> [accessed April 17, 2011].
- Diouf M., (2002) *Mondialisme et Régionalisme. Le "nouveau régionalisme" en Afrique*, IFAN, Cheikh Anta Diop University, Dakar
- Echinard Y, Guilhot L, (2007) *Le «nouveau régionalisme» de quoi parlons-nous ?*, Annuaire français de relations internationales, volume VIII p. 775-792.
- Fawole A., Charles Ukeje C., (2005) *The Crisis of the State and Regionalism in West Africa: Identity, Citizenship and Conflict*, Dakar, CODESRIA, 2005.
- Figuière C., Guilhot L., (2006) *Caractériser les processus régionaux: les apports d'une approche en termes de coordination*, «Mondes en développement», n° 135, p. 85.
- Gandois H., (2005) *Regionalism, a solution for the weak? A case study on Africa*, http://citynewyorkstateniland.academia.edu/HeleneGandois/Talks/545/Regionalism_a_solution_for_the_weak_A_case_study_on_Africa [accessed April 15, 2011].
- Gerbi A., (2006) *Histoire occultée de la décolonisation franco-africaine*, Paris.
- Kini A., *Organisation sous-régionale: Une seconde vie pour le Conseil de l'entente*, «Sidwaya», <http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article32370> [accessed June 11, 2011].
- Mansfield D., Milner H. V., (1999) *The new wave of regionalism*, "International Organization", vol. LIII, n° 3, pp. 589-627.
- Ndiaye B, (2010) *Françafrique. Stosunki francusko-afrykańskie – wczoraj i dziś, (History and present Day situation of French-African relations)*, IHSM, UWM, Olsztyn.
- Niane D.T., (1960) *Soundiata ou l'épopée mandingue*, Paris.
- Niang M., *The Kurukan Fuga Charter: An example of a Endogenous Governance Mechanism for Conflict Prevention*, <http://www.westafricaconflictprevention.org/westafricaconflictprevention.org/PDF-anglais/en-intro-charter-of-kurukan-fuga.pdf> [accessed June 17, 2011].
- Péan P., (1990) *L'homme de l'ombre. Éléments d'enquête autour de Jacques Foccart, l'homme le plus mystérieux et le plus puissant de la V^e République*, Paris.
- Sakho E. H. A., (2011) *L'intégration économique en Afrique de l'Ouest: analyses et perspectives*, Paris.
- Söderbaum F., Taylor I., (2007) *Micro-Regionalism in West Africa. Evidence from Two Case Studies*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2007.
- Somda J. D.: *La CEDEAO est une belle bête qui dort ...*, <http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article28616&rubrique62> [accessed June 15, 2011].
- http://wyborcza.pl/dziennikarze/1,84009.9416518,Wojna_o_Wybrzeze.html [accessed May 5, 2011].
- www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/04/28/cote-d-ivoire-le-chef-du-commando-invisible-a-ete-tue [accessed April 28, 2011].
- http://www.liptakogourma.org/spip.php?page=article&id_article=1 [accessed June 05, 2011].
- <http://www.omvs-soe.org/presentationomvs.htm> [accessed October 31, 2010].
- <http://www.cilss.bf/spip.php?rubrique1> [accessed October 31, 2010].
- <http://www.bidc-ebid.org/en/cedea0.php> [accessed June 12, 2011].